APR 4 1950
Desk
PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events

1918-1950

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXIX No. 25 MARCH 31, 1950

Should Bipartisan Foreign Policy Be Revived?

WASHINGTON — Despite the achievements of the United States since 1945 under "bipartisan" foreign policy, domestic political considerations still seriously disturb the country's activities abroad. The important place foreign policy occupies in party rivalry has become especially clear once more since the adjournment last November of the first session of the Eighty-first Congress. The United States again faces the question—which is as old as our nation—whether existing political institutions and political customs will ever permit any Federal Administration to determine in advance the role of the United States in world affairs and to execute a consistent foreign policy.

Congressional Opposition

The failure of the two political parties to persuade their members that they should follow a given line of policy and the separation of the powers of the President and Congress are two of the factors which account for the present inability of Secretary of State Dean Acheson to strengthen the position of the United States at a time when, in a series of speeches, he has been calling for the application of new strength.

In Congress, both Democrats and Republicans have opposed certain foreign policy proposals submitted to them by the Department of State. Sixty-one Democrats in the House of Representatives voted against the Korea aid bill on January 19, and a majority of the Democrats of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, disregarding Administration requests, voted on March 20 to distribute $1 billion of the 1950-51 Marshall Plan aid in the form of foodstuffs from the farm surpluses held by the Federal government.

Democratic opposition to the Administration's Point Four program for industrialization of underdeveloped areas caused Chairman John Kee of the Foreign Affairs Committee to include his Point Four bill in the general foreign-aid bill which the House began to debate on March 24. The general bill authorizes the Administration to spend $45 million for technical help to underdeveloped areas; $1.95 billion in cash and $1 billion in farm surpluses for the Economic Cooperation Administration; $100 million for Korea; and $27.45 million for Arab refugees from Palestine.

Although theirs is the minority party, many Republicans in Congress have been able to profit from the President's lack of discipline over his own party members by opposing, often successfully, the foreign policy course of Secretary Acheson. After blaming the Democratic Administration last autumn for the victory of the Communists in the Chinese civil war, Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, has attracted enough general support to make it politically impossible for the Department of State to develop its Chinese policy consistently along the line of the White Paper published last July. The White Paper attributed the Communists' successes in their conflict with the Kuomintang to forces rooted in Chinese conditions. This view seemed to point to American recognition of the People's Republic established by the Communists. Instead, the Administration has not only continued to assist the Kuomintang government but has modified its analysis of events in China by giving the Soviet Union more credit than formerly for the success of the Communists.

State of Bipartisanship

The Administration's foreign policy has also been weakened through the charges made by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, that the Department of State employs Communists in policy-making positions. While Senator McCarthy has so far been unable to prove his charges in the hearings before the Foreign Relations subcommittee, a Washington observer can see a twofold effect of the allegations. First, they deter many employes of the Department of State from speaking freely, even in confidential discussions, concerning the various considerations and possibilities that affect the making of policy on any area or issue. Second, they fortify the opponents of foreign policy legislation by increasing public and Congressional doubt of the competence of the Department of State to execute policy. Statements by Republican Senators H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Ralph M. Flanders of Vermont and Wayne Morse of Oregon, and Republican Representative Christian A. Herter of Massachusetts reveal that Senator McCarthy does not speak for the entire membership of his party. But leading Republicans have supported him and his accusations, among them Guy George Gabrielson chairman of the Republican National Committee and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee.

The American people might now con-

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association

sider whether it is possible to resolve the political dilemma that threatens to petrify foreign policy in Washington. Should President Truman try to revive the scheme of bipartisan cooperation that once worked well and that is still assumed to exist? The revival of true bipartisanship might mean that in the event of a Republican victory in the elections to the House and Senate next November, the President could nevertheless expect Congress to support his foreign policy. In a letter of March 25 to ECA Director Paul G. Hoffman, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, urged revival of the bipartisan system which he and former Senator John Foster Dulles had originally initiated. This suggestion has been widely acclaimed. But Senator Vandenberg is seriously ill, and Mr. Dulles is inactive in public affairs. Moreover, in their hope of winning control of Congress in the next elections, individual Republicans are less subject than formerly to the discipline which those Republicans who support Vandenberg would have to exert.

Alternatively, has the time come for President Truman to renounce bipartisanship on the ground that it no longer exists and is no longer practicable? Such a move might free Secretary Acheson from his present confused position over the degree of responsibility he owes to the Republican and Democratic parties, both of which he has tried to follow in opposite directions in dealing with Asia. The President can expect that some Republicans, in the coming campaign, will make party issues of China and of the presence, alleged or real, of Communist party members in public office. In the past it has been assumed that parties which disagree on domestic matters can agree on foreign policy. It is doubtful, however, whether a Democratic Administration can deal flexibly abroad with revolutionary situations in cooperation with another great party which has taken for its slogan, "Liberty vs. Socialism."

Only infrequently will the United States save foreign countries from threatened Soviet domination and assure their stability by proposing for them remedies which would be suitable for ourselves. The nature of a given society and its political needs are determined by the conditions in which that society exists, and those conditions change from nation to nation. While "socialism" may mean the negation of liberty to the Republican National Committee, it may signify liberty to the Iranians, Malayans and Indians, living in countries whose economic and social maladjustments make them ripe for great social changes. So long as attitudes toward society abroad are governed by attitudes toward society at home, Americans who disagree over home affairs will also disagree over foreign affairs. BLAIR BOLLES

Crisis Over Leopold Threatens Belgium's Economy

A prolonged cabinet crisis, industrial unrest and strikes, the revival of ancient controversies and the possibility of new parliamentary elections mark the course of Belgium's current effort to decide whether or not to invite King Leopold III to resume his throne. A question of purely domestic significance takes on international dimensions as it threatens to disrupt Belgium's economic and political reconstruction and even to disturb Western European recovery.

Attention in the United States has been directed to the question whether King Leopold during the war showed a lack of confidence in the Allied cause and even pro-Nazi tendencies. His surrender to the Germans on May 28, 1940, eighteen days after the invasion began, and his visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 19, 1940 are cases in point. The king's supporters, however, contend that he was simply facing reality and visited Hitler to seek concessions for Belgian civilians and prisoners of war.

The Constitutional Issue

A deeper issue, however, is at stake. Paul-Henri Spaak, former Belgian Premier and leader of the Socialist party which opposes the king's return, insists that the primary question is constitutional. It concerns Leopold's willingness to act as head of state without simultaneously trying to make major political decisions himself. M. Spaak charges that the king adopted his wartime policy against the advice of his ministers, who refused to accept responsibility for it.

The constitutional question vitally affects Leopold's future role. Although 57.68 per cent of the adult population of more than 5 million voted for his return in the national advisory referendum held on March 12, he won only 42.11 per cent in French-speaking, industrial Wallonia and 48.17 per cent in Brussels, as contrasted with 72 per cent in prevailingly agricultural and devoutly Catholic Flanders. If Leopold returns, the Walloons, and the anti-clerical Liberal, Socialist and Communist parties which they predominantly support, will bitterly oppose him.

The distribution of seats in Parliament complicates settlement of this issue. The Christian Social (Catholic) party, which received most of its support from Flanders and is committed to the king's return, holds 105 of the 212 seats in the Chamber of Representatives, two short of a majority. To maintain a cabinet in power, the Christian Social party has had to obtain additional support which it has received until now from the Liberals, who command 30 seats. The Socialists hold 65 seats, and the Communists 12.

The decision on the king's return, however, must be made by a joint session of the two chambers, which the Christian Social party with an absolute majority in the Senate, can control by a margin of seven. Since the Christian Social party cannot govern alone, however, it hesitates to force the king's return without obtaining some additional parliamentary support.

The Liberal party, moreover, obstructed the convening of a joint session when it withdrew from the coalition government on March 18, forcing Premier Gaston Eyskens to resign. The regent, Prince Charles, the king's brother, subsequently asked several men to attempt to form a new cabinet. Both Liberals and Socialists and M. Eyskens himself are reported willing to sanction the king's return provided he undertakes to abdicate shortly after in favor of Prince Baudouin, his 19-year-old son by his first wife, Queen Astrid, but the right wing of the Christian Social party is strongly opposed to such a concession. Failure to arrive at some compromise will precipitate new elections and cause a further delay in settling Belgium's royal question.

Meanwhile the Socialist party stepped up its campaign against the king by initiating a series of strikes through the Socialist-controlled Belgian Confederation of Labor. These strikes emphasize the disastrous economic consequences that a long-continued dispute over the royal question will entail.

The gravity of Belgium's economic predicament is indicated by the continuing

increase in unemployment. Whereas the jobless before the war numbered about 175,000 and only about 68,000 in 1947, by the end of 1949 the figure had reached 265,000, indicating a deep-seated problem which Belgium will need all its resources to meet.

Traditionally Belgium exported industrial and manufactured goods to Europe and used the exchange earned thereby to import raw materials from the United States and other dollar areas. When World War II ended, Belgium, with its relatively undamaged factories, made a quick comeback, providing steel and machinery for European recovery. Today, however, Belgium finds it increasingly difficult to market its products in Europe.

Moreover, from the outset Belgium's customers could not provide dollars in exchange for their purchases. At the same time Belgium needed raw materials which could only be obtained in the United States. During 1946 and 1947 Belgium was obliged to grant credits to its European debtors, a method which obviously could not be continued indefinitely. Subsequently the Marshall Plan provided conditional aid to be matched against Belgian drawing rights made available to the country's debtors. With the gradual reduction and approaching termination of Marshall aid, Belgium must find other ways to balance its international accounts.

Belgium's relatively high costs of production have brought a decline of total exports at a time when the country faces a buyer's rather than a seller's market. The high production costs may be traced to the Belgians' post-war policy of utilizing an unusually large portion of the national income for wages and consumers goods. Thus while other countries were saving rigorously in order to build up their productive resources, Belgium has been doing little more than restore its pre-war plant.

To improve the economic situation over the long run, Belgium will have to lower its costs and, by changing its production pattern, divert a greater share of its exports to dollar markets. All of this means drastic cuts in the general living standard, cuts which will bear most heavily on the existing export industries. It is precisely in the Walloon centers of these industries that the Socialists have their greatest strength and that the strikes against King Leopold's return have been most successful. Should the king return, the disaffected miners and steelworkers who will increasingly suffer from further cutbacks may focus their dissatisfaction on the monarch whom they opposed. Although the question of who is king does not, in itself, affect the basic economic outlook in Belgium, it is important to have a generally accepted monarch if the country is going to tackle its difficult transition problems effectively. Unless a compromise settlement concerning King Leopold can be agreed to by all the major parties, insistence on his return will continue to keep Belgium in a state of upheaval.

FRED W. RIGGS

What Should U.S. Information Policy Try to Do?

In a resolution introduced in Congress on March 22, Senator William Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, called for a "Marshall Plan in the field of ideas" as a bold, positive step to replace the negative attitude which, he said, "has temporarily so focused our minds on the obdurate men of the Kremlin that we bury our heads in the sands of our own frustration." This resolution, supported by ten other Senators—six Democrats and four Republicans—aims at closing "the mental gulf that separates the United States from other peoples and that now blockades the universal hope for freedom and peace."

Making Propaganda Effective

The aim outlined by Senator Benton will presumably enlist the enthusiastic support of most Americans, with the exception of those who believe the United States should abstain entirely from propagating its ideas and practices. While there is little dispute about the advisability of an American propaganda program, it is not always easy to reach agreement concerning the best methods of bridging the "mental gulf" between us and other peoples. Nor is this surprising. For in order to reach other peoples effectively over a long period it is essential to know both which of our outstanding national characteristics are those best adapted for presentation abroad, and what the reaction of people abroad to these characteristics is likely to be.

The Achilles heel of the principal propaganda efforts of our times has proved to be the failure to make an accurate estimate of audience reactions. The Nazis had no doubts about the aspects of the German *Weltanschauung* which they thought worthy of promoting abroad—the "master-race" boast, the vaunted indestructibility of the German military machine, the Communist menace. Where they went wrong was in assuming that these ideas, alone or in combination, would capture the interest and win the support of enough people outside Germany to make possible the attainment of Hitler's foreign policy objectives without war. The Soviet leaders have succeeded in holding world attention for over thirty years—partly because communism, as preached from Moscow, had the advantage in its initial stages of operating as an international movement with a claim to universal appeal, in contrast to the narrowly national and racist appeal of the German Nazis; but in even larger part because the doctrines of communism had, and in many countries still have, a powerful attraction for all those who are poverty-stricken and restless. To the extent, however, that the Kremlin attempts to harness communism solely to the national interests of the Russian state, it jeopardizes and may ultimately destroy the effectiveness of its propaganda—most of all in countries ruled by Communist regimes.

In formulating American propaganda, it is essential, first, to define the values we consider most important for export under a "Marshall Plan in the field of ideas"; and, second, assess the impression our values will make on other peoples. This twofold task is complicated by genuine and legitimate divergences among ourselves as to the ideas we want to promote and see adopted abroad. All of us stress our wide range of freedoms (although Admiral William H. Standley, former Ambassador to Russia, recently objected to "freedom from want" as too radical). Most of us pay at least lip-service to racial equality and non-discrimination—although recognizing the gap that still separates reality from the ideal.

Important Divergences

In the economic and social field divergences are sharper. Some of us recognize the extent to which the concept of free enterprise has been gradually modified here by voluntary acceptance of various forms of governmental intervention

in economic life. Others consider socialism of the British type a stage in transition to communism, or even identical with communism, and yearn to abolish both. Some see no viable alternative to communism in backward areas except a program of reforms that would strike at the roots of ancient and modern maladjustments. Others, fearful of change here, sometimes consciously, but most often unconsciously, want to defend the *status quo* abroad.

Which of these diverse schools of thought represents the opinions of the majority of the American people? Who is to decide this in elaborating the propaganda program of the United States? Would it be advisable for the American people to make themselves heard directly —not merely through official presentations—in other nations? And is there a way of doing it?

But even after we have answered these questions, we still must discover how our ideas affect peoples abroad. What impression, for example, do we make in Britain and other strongly Socialist countries of Europe by denouncing socialism? A. A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretry of State, a non-Socialist well-known for his opposition to communism, believes our failure to realize that "outside the Iron Curtain, organized Socialism is a major non-Communist force" constitutes "the blunder that may destroy the West."* Socialism "would not be acceptable to most Americans." But "the demonstrable fact," Mr. Berle contends, "is that Socialist governments and parties do not lead towards a Communist state."

While promoting our own ideas abroad, we need to develop at least as much patience with the imperfections of others as we hope to enlist for our own. We are entitled to insist on the desirability of free elections, provided we understand why less advanced peoples have not reached our stage of political maturity, just as we ourselves plead for time in the realization of our racial ideals when taken to task on this score by critics abroad. It is legitimate for us to criticize the imperialist practices of all nations, whether democracies like Britain and France or Communist dictatorships like Russia. But our criticisms will sound more convincing abroad if we do not take over, on the plea of self-defense, some of the obligations of colonial powers, as in the case of Indo-China. We are within our rights to reject planned economy if we think that is the thing to do. But we shall be accused of double-talk if at the same time we urge the Marshall Plan nations to hasten their integration—a goal which calls for a great deal of economic planning.

Mr. Benton's resolution wisely recognizes the existence of a mental gulf between us and other peoples. This gulf cannot be successfully closed with Fourth-of-July platitudes about democracy. Nor can it be closed, as in time of war, by dramatic appeals to other peoples to hit specified targets—unless we decide to use psychological warfare measures to foment revolutions in Russia and neighboring countries. If we are aiming not at short-term victories but at a long-term program, we may benefit by General Eisenhower's advice in his address of March 24 on "Implementing the Peace of the World":

> "There is no need to remake the world, outside the Soviet system, in the likeness of the United States or any other country. What I do suggest is that we recognize that every culture developed in the world has been worked out by its possessors to meet the circumstances of their own environment. Each race and each nation can learn from every other. There is none so close to self-sufficiency that it can do without the help and cooperation of others; none so primitive that it has not amassed a wisdom that can possibly enlighten even the most advanced."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

United Nations World, Vol. IV (January 1950), p. 13.

Branches and Affiliates

*BUFFALO, April 1, *Model General Assembly*, Frank C. Nash

*ELMIRA, April 4, *Atomic Energy and Its Effect Upon Foreign Policy*, Lloyd P. Smith

MILWAUKEE, April 4, *Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

MINNEAPOLIS, April 5, *Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

ST. PAUL, April 6, *Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

*NEW YORK, April 11, *The Problem of Underdeveloped Areas*, George McGhee

POUGHKEEPSIE, April 12, *How American Policy Is Formulated*, Joseph Johnson

*Data taken from printed announcement.

News in the Making

AFTER THE ECA: The State Department, with the endorsement of the Economic Cooperation Administration, has proposed that President Truman appoint a cabinet-level committee on long-range foreign economic policy to be assisted by a commission of private citizens. The recommendation, which received the support of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg on March 25, is expected to be acted on by the President when he returns from Key West in April.

WASHINGTON AND SAIGON: Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup—recently returned from his Far Eastern tour—have been holding a series of consultations with Congressmen in the hope of clarifying the main outlines of a comprehensive policy in Asia. Interest focuses on Indo-China where a riot of 4,000 students and workers was touched off in Saigon on March 19 by the presence of two United States destroyers.

VIGILANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN: In a report published on March 20, the commission appointed last January by the Organization of American states to investigate the Haiti-Dominican dispute, absolved Haiti of the Dominican Republic's charge that the Haitian government was conspiring against Trujillo, but found that not only the Dominican Republic but also Cuba and Guatemala were to blame for the conspiracies which have disturbed the Caribbean area during the past three years. The report recommended that the sanctions established in the Rio de Janeiro military alliance be invoked, if necessary, to prevent repetition of such disturbances.

TALKS LAG ON PAYMENTS UNION: As discussions continue on the proposed European Payments Union, it becomes increasingly apparent that the complex technical proposals and counter-proposals tend to obscure the basic conflict between Britain and the United States. While Washington continues to emphasize the need for an integrated European economy, the British insist on their right to conduct trade according to bilateral agreements, and to exempt sterling from the proposed union's convertibility requirements.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXIX, No. 25, MARCH 31, 1950. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, *President;* VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor;* WILLIAM W. WADE, *Associate Editor.* Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.